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I was sitting as a member of that court. This decision was based
upon the possibility that I might have discussed the case with my
colleagues. I felt that even though I might have no conscious rec-
ollection of discussing the particular matter, I might have done so,
and that this could raise the appearance of impropriety.
I would like to share a personal experience regarding the notion
of the appearance of impropriety. Shortly after I left the court,
there was an indictment returned relating to the Teamster pension
fund. My firm was retained to appear before Judge Prentice Mar-
shall in that case on behalf of one of the defendants. I did not
participate in the pension fund case. I felt that I just was not ready
to appear before Judge Marshall. About six or nine months later, I
received in the mail a form letter from Judge Marshall, informing
me that I had been appointed to represent a plaintiff in a Title VII
sex discrimination case. I called Judge Marshall and thanked him
for the appointment, telling him that my firm certainly needed the
business. And he let me know that this was his invitation to ap-
pear in his courtroom. I have since appeared in Judge Marshall's
courtroom, and have appeared before several of the other judges
with whom I had previously sat. I have never found it to be an
impediment, as long as I keep in mind and try to live up to Justice
Black's observation that "undivided allegiance and faithful devoted
service to a client are the prized traditions of the American law-
yer." If we lawyers conduct ourselves in accordance with those tra-
ditions, we will successfully resolve most of our ethical problems.
ETHICS OF SWITCHING SIDES - II
Jill Wine-Banks*
Although it would be much more exciting if I picked apart
something that Judge Crowley told you, I cannot do that because I
agree with just about everything that he said. But perhaps I can
make more real, particularly to students, some of the problems
Judge Crowley discussed which lawyers are likely to encounter
eventually. These problems may now seem rather esoteric, but
they are serious and real problems in the private practice of law.
Because governments change, any rule concerning the revolving
* Solicitor General, State of Illinois; B.S. 1964, University of Illinois; J.D. 1968, Co-
lumbia University. Ms. Wine-Bank was formerly a Watergate Special Prosecutor and
was a partner at Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois, at the time of this speech.
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door46 from government service to private practice has to be mod-
erated to some extent. A complete ban against movement in and
out of government is both unwise and unworkable. One way to
avoid a total ban is to construct a Chinese wall. If you have not
encountered this concept, you may not know what it is or how it
comes up. The Chinese wall is the means by which a law firm
segregates out a disqualified attorney so that he or she does not
participate in any way in a particular case.47 Whatever procedures
are used to create a Chinese wall, the result must at least bar the
disqualified lawyer from sharing in the fees if he or she is a partner.
There must be no discussions or other sharing of information with
the disqualified attorney by lawyers in the firm who are working on
the case. The Chinese wall must be established before the conflict
arises or is brought to the court's attention. If the wall is set up
after the opponent makes a motion to disqualify, it is already too
late because the firm can never prove that there was not some shar-
ing of information or some contamination of the firm by the knowl-
edge of the disqualified attorney.48
Conflicts and the need to screen out one attorney in a firm come
up in many, many ways. A situation that was not addressed by
Judge Crowley is the husband-wife conflict.49 One of the realities
of today's practice is that with many couples both the husband and
wife are attorneys, and their firms may be on opposite sides. I
know this sounds like the movie "Adam's Rib," but it really does
happen. For example, in my own firm one of my partners is mar-
ried to the chief lawyer for AT&T. We represent MCI in the liti-
gation against AT&T. In such a case, we obviously had to screen
my partner from anything to do with the MCI/AT&T case or else
we might have been disqualified from representing MCI. It has
been held sufficient that my partner has been totally eliminated
from any discussion or sharing in the profits from that case,
through the creation of a Chinese wall and a complicated book-
keeping system and restricted distribution of information about the
case.
46. This term is used to describe the practice of lawyers moving back and forth be-
tween the government and private practice. See LaCovara, Restricting the Private Law
Practice of Former Government Lawyers, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 369 (1978).
47. See generally Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980).
48. See Comment, supra note 47, at 713.
49. Rule 1.8(i) of the Model Rules provides that a husband and wife must not repre-
sent clients whose interests are "directly adverse" without first obtaining the consent of
the respective clients after consultation.
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Similar conflicts arise when a lawyer comes, as I did, from gov-
ernment.5 ° This revolving door between government service and
private practice happens often in Washington, D.C., where a law-
yer frequently starts out in government, leaves for private practice,
then goes back into a new administration, and then returns once
again to private practice.
When I joined Jenner & Block, I came to Chicago from Wash-
ington, D.C., after serving as General Counsel of the Army. There
is almost no firm in Chicago that does not represent someone in
some capacity against the Army, or which is not involved in nego-
tiations with the Army for government contracts. For this reason,
I felt that I could not even talk to a law firm about potential em-
ployment until I had resigned my position, because were I to talk
with them, I would compromise myself in the exercise of my gov-
ernmental duties. Therefore, it was only after I resigned and
moved to Chicago that I even talked to any firm about a partner-
ship. Then, when I was interviewing, one of the largest clients of
Jenner & Block was a corporation with significant government
contracts. This caused a lot of discussion between me and Jenner
& Block as to whether a Chinese wall would work for me. This
discussion was complicated by the fact that at the time, the Second
Circuit had recently decided a case called Armstrong v. McAlpin.5
The court had held that a Chinese wall was not adequate and that
if someone came into a firm who was barred from a particular case
because of a conflict, then the whole firm had to give up the case.-2
This matter had to be resolved before I could be offered a partner-
ship in a firm that might have to give up a significant client if the
Armstrong case withstood further appeal. Fortunately, the case
was reheard en banc and overturned, so the problem was
eliminated.53
Besides the ethical problems which may result when government
attorneys go into private practice, there is also the need to comply
with federal regulations in this area. As Judge Crowley stated, af-
ter an attorney leaves the government, it is illegal to appear within
50. For a general discussion of the issues involved in the switch from government
service to the private sector, see LaCovara, supra note 41; Mundheim, Rethinking the
Revolving Door, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 707 (1981); Developments in the Law - Con-
flicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1428-43 (1981).
51. 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979).
52. Id. at 34.
53. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). The en banc court agreed with the district court judge
that the former government attorney had been sufficiently screened from his firm's partic-
ipation in the case. 625 F.2d at 445.
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one year before his or her former agency in connection with a mat-
ter which had been under his or her official responsibility.14 The
law also prohibits a former government attorney from being in-
volved for two years in any case which was actually pending under
his or her official responsibility within the year prior to his or her
leaving the government." In addition, a former government attor-
ney is permanently barred from switching sides in any case in
which he or she participated personally and substantially while in
the government's employ. 6 This criminal prohibition relating to
cases in which a former government employee was personally and
substantially involved carries over to partners of that former gov-
ernment attorney.57 These rules meant that I could not, in any
capacity, make an argument to the Army or represent anyone
before the Army. Furthermore, neither I nor any of my partners
could be involved in cases which I had had substantial personal
involvement. I was lucky, however, because the Pentagon actually
consists of four separate agencies-the Department of Defense, the
Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The fact that I could appear
before three out of the four branches of that entity moderated the
effects of that limitation for me.
I disagree with the section of the rules barring appearances
before one's former agency. I think there is a way to make appro-
priate judgments, as Judge Crowley made judgments about
whether he would handle cases in front of judges with whom he
had previously sat on the bench. Just as Judge Crowley described
making a decision about whether to appear in a particular case
before a former colleague on a case by case basis, I believe that the
decision regarding appearing before your former agency can be
54. 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1982).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 207(b), (c) (1982).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a), (c) (1982).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 207(g) (1982).
MODEL CODE DR 5-105(D) provides that "[i]f a lawyer is required to decline employ-
ment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associ-
ate, or any other lawyer affilated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such
employment." If read literally in conjunction with DR 9-101(B) of the Model Code,
which precludes a lawyer from accepting private employment in any matter in which he
or she had substantial responsibility while serving as a public employee, DR 5-105(D)
would disqualify a former government attorney's entire law firm if he or she were barred
by DR 9-101(B). However, the ABA has not applied a literal interpretation. See ABA
COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL Op. 342, at 10. The
new Model Rules provide that if a lawyer is disqualified from a case because of personal
and substantial involvement while he or she was a government employee, the lawyer's law
firm will also be disqualified, unless the lawyer is screened from the case, he or she is not
apportioned a part of the fee earned in the case, and written notice is promptly given to
the appropriate government agency. MODEL RULES Rule 1.11.
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made on the facts of a particular case by the individual involved.
Under some circumstances it would have been inappropriate for
me to go before someone in the Pentagon to make a request, but I
do not think that a blanket prohibition is necessary. I believe that
the judgment of whether it is appropriate or inappropriate to ap-
pear before one's former agency should be made more flexible.
Furthermore, I do not consider it inappropriate to be able to
make a phone call to someone you know and to get an appoint-
ment simply because you know that person. Once you meet, it is
not going to influence the outcome of the matter. I firmly believe
that public servants act in the public interest, not on the basis of
friendship. When I was General Counsel of the Army, someone
would call and would be able to get an appointment to see me,
rather than a staff person, because I knew them from some other
context. I did not make a decision that helped or hurt them be-
cause I knew them. I made the decision that was appropriate to
the case. I do not think it is wrong to use your knowledge of the
people in an agency any more than it would be wrong for a lawyer
to use knowledge gained during government employment of how
an agency functions.
Another issue which arises quite frequently is the representation
of two potentially conflicting parties. It happens if you represent
co-defendants, and it occurs in civil litigation in a variety of ways.
For example, it happened to me yesterday in a deposition in a case
where I represent an accounting firm which split off from another
firm and is suing its former firm. The former firm was deposing
accounting clients that my client's new firm took with it. In addi-
tion to representing the new accounting firm, I also was represent-
ing a witness/client because he was being sued for allegedly owing
money to the old firm, which my clients believed was owed to them
because they had done the actual work. Before the deposition be-
gan, I was challenged as to my right to represent both sides, on the
grounds that I might have a conflict in representing them.
You can resolve such a potential conflict in several ways, one of
which is to get informed consent from both parties. You tell both
parties about the potential conflict and the consequences, and then
they can waive the conflict. 8 However, I think that you must de-
cide in your own mind whether there is a potential conflict. If a
58. If there are potential conflicts between two clients in litigation, one lawyer may
represent both clients if the lawyer reasonably believes that he or she can represent both
clients adequately, and both clients consent to the representation after full disclosure.
MODEL CODE DR 5-105(A)-(C).
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conflict exists, I think that it is an inappropriate and unfortunate
position for a lawyer to be in, even if there was a knowing waiver.
One reason it is an inappropriate position is that it creates an ap-
pearance of impropriety, which, in my view, should be one of the
overriding factors in making a judgment about disqualification due
to conflicts.
A conflict may also arise when a law firm is retained as counsel
against a former client of the firm. I recently had a firm disquali-
fied because my client had had some estate planning done by the
firm representing his opponent. My client's financial condition,
which he had disclosed during the time this other firm had an at-
torney-client relationship with him, was a key fact in the current
litigation.
The resolution of conflicts is very complicated because of the
large size of law firms and the frequent movement by lawyers from
one firm to another. Once again, that brings us back to the ques-
tion of whether the Chinese wall concept cures these conflict situa-
tions. Not all courts have found the Chinese wall to be appropriate
or effective, 59 but considering the nature of practice today, if we
don't have Chinese walls there is going to be a serious impediment
to the practice of law. Similarly, with the revolving door, we must
keep in mind that the government will be very seriously affected if
lawyers are unable to leave government service and freely pursue
private practice.
ETHICS OF SWITCHING SIDES - III
William Martin*
The state of the law and the practical problems involved in
switching sides have been articulated very clearly by Judge Crow-
ley and Ms. Jill Wine-Banks. I would like to suggest a new per-
59. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F. 2d 1311, 1321
(7th Cir.) (in a concurrent representation case, the court found that a Chinese wall had
not been constructed between the firm's Chicago-based attorneys working for Westing-
house, and its Washington, D.C.-based attorneys working for a trade association which
included three oil companies being sued by Westinghouse in an antitrust action; the court
indicated that it did "not recognize the wall theory as modifying the presumption that
actual knowledge of one or more lawyers in a firm is imputed to each member of that
firm"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 567 F.2d 225, 229 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977) (the court agreed with the trial court that a
Chinese wall could not be built in a single law firm representing two adverse clients in the
same lawsuit).
* Private Practice, Chicago, Illinois; B.S. 1958, J.D. 1961, Loyola University of
Chicago.
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spective on this subject. But first, I would like to describe the
personal metamorphosis that I underwent in the practice of law.
All through my career here at Loyola Law School and after
graduation, I had made up my mind that I wanted to be a criminal
defense lawyer. I felt that being a prosecutor was really the
equivalent of applying for membership in the Nazi Party. The only
thing I wanted to do in the world was to be an assistant public
defender. Unfortunately for me, that office, probably in the exer-
cise of supreme wisdom, decided not to hire me. Illinois Supreme
Court Justice Daniel Ward, then the State's Attorney of Cook
County, had made the traditional campaign promise that the
State's Attorney's Office would not hire on political grounds. He
promised to select outstanding graduates, at least one from every
law school in Illinois. I had been unable to find work for a consid-
erable period of time, and then learned that Dean Hayes of Loyola
received this letter of invitation from Dan Ward asking for
Loyola's best graduates. I was not the best in my graduating class
but I was the only one who responded to the invitation. Out of
economic necessity, I had to jettison my concept that I was joining
the Nazi Party and take the oath of allegiance as a Cook County
Assistant State's Attorney. In a very short period of time, I discov-
ered that the concept of justice for the underdog, which had dic-
tated my entire college and law school career, had changed
completely. Facing the task of becoming a prosecutor, I found that
I quickly developed a real zeal for the job.
When I left the State's Attorney's Office after six and one-half
years of experience to enter private practice, the current sensitivity
about switching sides did not exist. I suspect that lawyers had not
yet developed the concept of a motion to disqualify as a strategic
device to hamper the opposition's case. State's attorneys fre-
quently left to go into private practice. You obviously did not de-
fend the same case you started to prosecute, but beyond that
general restriction no rules existed. You left the building one day
after your farewell party, and then you returned the following day
with your first client. You then found out that all the good will
you thought you had developed with the courtroom personnel, the
police department, and your colleagues had quickly gone down the
drain.
Perhaps it was again a result of economic necessity, but in my
very first case as a defense lawyer I immediately shed all of the
prosecutorial zeal I had developed. People asked me how I was
able to make the adjustment from prosecution to defense work.
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My response was that I had found little or no adjustment. My
current client was a defendant, whereas my client last week hap-
pened to be the People of the State of Illinois. But since I was an
advocate, I didn't have any problem adjusting to the switch in
sides.
As I have grown older and perhaps spent too much time exclu-
sively as a defense lawyer, I have reached a conclusion which leads
to my new perspective on changing sides. I have concluded there
is not enough switching of sides in our legal system. If, as a de-
fense lawyer in 1984, I tried a case against the type of prosecutor
that I had been in 1965, I would consider that prosecutor to be
insufferably self-righteous, totally narrow-minded, and lacking in
any sense of empathy or compassion. In some respects I would
view the prosecutor as being unfit to handle the responsibility of
prosecution. In all candor, even though I would look upon myself
as being one of the fairer and better prosecutors, that narrow-
minded description would still apply.
In our current practice, law school graduates go right to the
State's Attorney's Office or to the Public Defender's Office and stay
there for five or six years. I believe that this practice leads to a
system in which those lawyers very quickly develop what can be
described as either a prosecution mentality or a defense lawyer
mentality. Our system allows prosecutors to develop in a very iso-
lated environment where they do nothing but prosecute. Prosecu-
tors thus become victims of the same kind of cynicism that is
known to permeate law enforcement officers. Certainly I am not
suggesting that the prosecutor or the law enforcement officer is a
bad person. However, we all become victims of our experience. If
you sit in your office every day and talk to the survivors of a near
and dear relative who was brutally murdered, or to a rape victim,
or to a homeowner who did not get his property back, you natu-
rally develop a definite mind set. This attitude permeates your ac-
tivity to such an extent that it is hard to see beyond the confines of
this narrow tunnel. It may culminate in unfair recommendations
for sentencing or in the adoption of the unfortunate philosophy
that the ends justify the means.
I believe that we would have a better legal system if, in major
cases, trial lawyers could represent the prosecution one day and the
next week appear for the defense in another case.6' My recommen-
60. Such a system would be very similar to the English legal system. The legal pro-
fession in England is divided into solicitors and barristers. Solicitors handle the prepara-
tory stages of litigation, such as preparing evidence and interviewing witnesses. Solicitors
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dation is admittedly a very utopian one. But the practice of retain-
ing trial lawyers for the prosecution in one case and for the defense
in another case would result in a highly capable trial bar being
available to both the state and the defense. Young lawyers would
be exposed to both prosecution and defense work and become more
sensitive and effective advocates. Such a trial bar would have sub-
stantially more integrity than the bar which we have developed. 61
I realize that I might be a little presumptuous in telling people that
I want to restructure the entire legal system, so that we have a true
criminal trial bar that is available to both sides. But today's discus-
sion presents a wonderful opportunity for exploring new perspec-
tives. I am convinced that our system of criminal justice would
benefit enormously if it required lawyers practicing criminal law to
switch sides regularly.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS*
QUESTION: It seems there has been a tremendous shift in the abil-
ity of recent law school and other professional graduates to be able
to discern ethical issues from an ethical perspective, because of the
decline of the arts in college education. Would you advise law
school admission committees to include this as a factor in selecting
candidates, in addition to grade point average and LSAT exams?
MR. MARTIN: It is difficult to make an accurate evaluation of how
a law school applicant is going to turn out ethically in the practice
of law. People who went through a very tough screening process at
very well known law schools have been disbarred. My suggestion
regarding trial lawyers doing both prosecution and defense work is
based, in part, on my belief that a lawyer should not do only prose-
cution work for six years and then do defense work for the rest of
have the right to appear in the lower courts. They also engage in a variety of non-litiga-
tion matters. R. WALKER & M. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 192 (2d ed.
1970). Barristers, on the other hand, are primarily advocates. They have an exclusive
right of audience in the higher civil and criminal courts. D. KARLEN, ANGLO-AMERI-
CAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 31 (1967). A barrister does both prosecution and defense work.
After prosecuting a case on behalf of the Crown one week, he might next represent a
defendant. For a general discussion of the division between barristers and solicitors, see
Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, JR., LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 357-98 (1970); D.
KARLEN, supra, at 30-32; R. WALKER & M. WALKER, supra, at 191-210.
61. I do not think that the confidentiality issue would be problematic under this type
of system.
* These questions and answers are merely representative of the stimulating
discussion following the lectures. The complete transcript is available from Loyola
University of Chicago School of Law.
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his or her life, because he or she is ill-equipped those first six years.
I do not know how you can solve that problem when you are se-
lecting a law school candidate.
Ms. WINE-BANKS: Although the idea of young lawyers doing
both prosecution and defense work is an interesting one, some is-
sues must be considered. For one thing, the zeal that young prose-
cutors have may well be a part of our legal system. A lawyer is an
advocate, and should argue his or her heart out, for whichever side
the lawyer represents. I am concerned that, particularly with
young lawyers, this going back and forth will prevent their ever
being able to develop that kind of one-sided zeal. I would like to
relate a personal experience relating to this point.
During Watergate, the three trial lawyers were Jim Neal, Rick
Ben-Veniste and myself. Jim had been in private practice as a de-
fense attorney for many years just before Watergate. Earlier in his
career, he had been a prosecutor. He had prosecuted Jimmy Hoffa,
and then had gone into private practice. Rick and I had both come
out of the Department of Justice directly to Watergate. We had
many a fight with Jim where we said, "Jim, you're an old softy;
what do you mean you're not going to indict this guy? Or, "What
do you mean you see his side? That's ridiculous." Jim would just
cluck his tongue and say, "Oh, you youngsters, you don't know
what you're doing because you've never been on the other side."
And I have to admit that as soon as I went into private practice
after Watergate, I understood what he meant.
There is no question that you do not understand the other side,
and that you do things that you would not do if you had been on
the other side and understood that point of view. I think I am a
better defense lawyer for having been a prosecutor, for some of the
reasons which Bill Martin mentioned. Because I can see how I
would have prosecuted the case, I can better defend the case. I
also know the system and thus can be more effective in defending.
I think that's good. And, at the same time, I also think that I
would be a more effective prosecutor if I were to go back again,
because of my experience defending and in seeing the other side.
I don't know, however, that I could have made a daily switch
back and forth between defending and prosecuting, particularly
when I was right out of law school. I think I could do it now
because I have had enough experience on both sides to develop a
firm grasp of the roles of both the prosecutor and the defense law-
yer. I just wonder at what stage in life that becomes possible. Yet,
1985]
Loyola University Law Journal
despite these reservations, I do think that Bill's idea has some mer-
its and could work.
Jenner & Block sends some of its associates to the State's Attor-
ney's Office to help them prosecute for short periods of time, and
also to the Federal Defender's Office to defend. This gives the as-
sociates immediate trial experience, which you would not other-
wise get in private practice, and it also familiarizes them with both
sides.
MR. CROWLEY: I think Bill's idea of alternating every now and
then between prosecution and defense work is a good one. If you
only do one type of work constantly I think you can become jaded.
That is why I really enjoy doing both civil and criminal work. Do-
ing the civil work makes me a better criminal defense lawyer and
vice versa.
QUESTION: What about a situation where an attorney invests in a
client's business and later suspects that he was induced to invest as
a result of fraud, or has a similar sort of complaint against a client?
Does the lawyer have any right to protect his individual position?
MR. CROWLEY: Of course. Your question raises the issue of the
manner in which lawyers should protect themselves. A lawyer can
certainly wear different hats. He can be an investor as well as a
lawyer.62 However, he should try to keep at arm's length from his
clients on all levels, because it destroys the lawyer's objectivity if he
becomes too close to them. Lawyers must conduct their affairs so
as not to give rise to the appearance of impropriety.
A related issue which has been raised in many large law firms is
whether an attorney should serve as a director of a corporation
when he is also general counsel to that corporation. There may be
a potential conflict in such a situation.
QUESTION: In a recent case a defendant's attorney resigned to be-
come a prosecutor. The defendant then moved to disqualify the
entire prosecutor's office. That case led the court to examine the
appearance of impropriety standard. Do you believe that standard
should be eliminated, as it has been under the new Model Rules, 63
62. See MODEL CODE DR 5-104(A) (a lawyer must not enter into a business transac-
tion with a client unless the client consents after full disclosure); MODEL RULES Rule
1.8(a) (requiring that a business transaction between a lawyer and client be reasonable
and fair to the client, and that the client consent in writing after full disclosure).
63. MODEL CODE Canon 9 states that "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appear-
ance of Professional Impropriety." Comment to Model Rule 1.11 of the Model Rules
eliminates the appearance of impropriety standard in the area of vicarious
disqualification.
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and, if so, what are the implications?
MR. CROWLEY: The federal statute on disqualification of judges
states that a judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." I think
that the way in which either impartiality or the appearance of im-
propriety is determined is somewhat reminiscent of Justice Stew-
art's comments about obscenity, that he can not define it but he
knows what it is when he sees it.6 I do not think the term "ap-
pearance of impropriety" means different things to different peo-
ple. I think that all of us in this room would agree on whether or
not a given set of circumstances created an appearance of impro-
priety. I am comfortable with the term "appearance of impropri-
ety" because of its all-inclusiveness.
MR. MARTIN: My firm does a small amount of disciplinary work.
I am not aware of any cases in which a lawyer was disciplined
solely on the basis that his conduct created the appearance of im-
propriety. The term is usually included as an alternative ground in
a conflict of interest disciplinary case. My sense is that it has no
independent life as a disciplinary rule.
QUESTION: Judge Crowley, would you apply the same standard in
a motion to disqualify the defense counsel in a criminal case as you
would in a civil case?
MR. CROWLEY: I think they are distinctly different standards, be-
cause in a criminal case there are sixth amendment considerations.
An accused is entitled as a matter of right to the assistance of coun-
sel. In my view, it would take a lot more to disqualify somebody in
a criminal case then it would in a civil case.
An example relates to this point. In one case, I spent the better
part of a day with three defendants, all sophisticated businessmen,
who were being represented by a very sophisticated lawyer. I told
them how this lawyer might not serve each of their interests effec-
tively by representing all of them, because I was required to warn
them about this potential conflict of interest. The defendants indi-
cated that they understood, but that they all still wanted that law-
yer. I allowed the lawyer to represent all of the defendants. I felt
that they had made the correct decision.
QUESTION: So it would take more than the mere appearance of
impropriety to disqualify a defense attorney?
64. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982).
65. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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MR. CROWLEY: That is absolutely correct. Judges must tread
lightly before they can disqualify counsel, because of a defendant's
sixth amendment rights.
In a criminal case it is the government who is going to be mak-
ing the motion to disqualify. Our society should not be in a situa-
tion in which the government chooses defense lawyers for accused
persons.
